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AP Workshop – Jon Rogowski, Harvard University

AP Workshop - Jon Rogowski, Harvard University DateFebruary 13, 2017 Time12:30pm to 2:00pm Location 4357 Bunche Hall Contact Abstract:Though economic development is commonly posited to depend on the quality of political institutions, empirical research focuses mostly on how the nature and design of economic institutions affects developmental outcomes. We argue that infrastructural projects play a […]

International Relations Workshop with Susan Hyde

International Relations Workshop with Susan Hyde DateFebruary 19, 2015 Time12:00pm Location 4276 Bunche Hall Contact Contact Information Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu Presenter:Susan Hyde, Yale UniversityTitle:"The Individual-Level Consequences of Democracy Promotion: A Field Experiment in Rural Cambodia"About the Speaker:Susan Hyde is Associate Professor of Political Science & International Affairs at Yale University. She studies international influences on domestic […]

REP Workshop with Jane Anna Gordon

REP Workshop with Jane Anna Gordon DateFebruary 19, 2015 Time12:00pm to 1:30pm Location 4357 Bunche Hall Contact Contact Information Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu Presenter:Jane Anna Gordon, University of ConnecticutTitle: "Creolizing Political Theory”About the Speaker:Jane Gordon (Ph.D. 2005, Univ. of Pennsylvania) is Associate Professor of Political Science (Political Theory) as well as of African American Studies at UConn.  She […]

Nuclear Russian Roulette: A Model of Proliferation and Preventive War

Nuclear Russian Roulette: A Model of Proliferation and Preventive War DateFebruary 21, 2014 Time7:00am to 8:30am Location 11377 Bunche Hall Contact We (Muhammet A. Bas and Andrew J. Coe) develop a formal model of bargaining between two states, where one can invest in developing nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its efforts and progress […]

Varieties of Corruption: The Organization of Rent-Sharing in India

Varieties of Corruption: The Organization of Rent-Sharing in India DateFebruary 21, 2014 Time6:00am to 7:30am Location 4357 Bunche Hall Contact Studies of corruption shed little light on ways in which corrupt rents are distributed across actors—insights that would prove enlightening for efforts to reduce corruption. I posit that the type of state resource over which […]

REP Workshop – Anna Sampaio

REP Workshop - Anna Sampaio DateFebruary 19, 2016 Time4:00pm to 6:00pm Location 4357 Bunche Hall  Contact Professor Sampaio will be talking about her new book:(Terrorizing Latina/o Immigrants: Race, Gender, and Immigration Politics in the Age of Security, 2015, Temple University Press) Event Details: Parking | Directions Please register here:

Paola Marrati’s Talk

Paola Marrati's Talk DateFebruary 23, 2018 Time4:00pm to 6:00pm Location 4357 Bunche Hall Contact Contact Information Belinda SunnuPhone (310)206-7558bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu A Voice's of One's Own. Cavell on Wittgenstein, Emerson, and Democracy Event Details: Parking | Directions Please register here:

Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from the Spatial Allocation of Constituency Development Fund Spending in Kenya

Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from the Spatial Allocation of Constituency Development Fund Spending in Kenya DateFebruary 24, 2014 Time4:00am to 5:30am Location 4357 Bunche Hall Contact We draw on data on the spatial allocation of more than 50,000 constituency development fund projects in more than 200 electoral constituencies in Kenya to test leading […]

Benjamin Lessing’s Talk

Benjamin Lessing's Talk DateFebruary 26, 2018 Time12:00pm to 1:30pm Location 4357 Bunche Hall Contact Contact Information Belinda SunnuPhone (310)206-7558bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu Paper Event Details: Parking | Directions Please register here:

Choosing (All) Together

Choosing (All) Together DateFebruary 26, 2014 Time7:00am to 9:00am Location 4276 Bunche Hall Contact This article provides a game theoretic analysis of group decision making, investigating how agents’ communication behavior is affected by different voting systems. We show that in an ideal state where communication is noisy but agents can communicate without opportunity costs, agents […]