Choosing (All) Together

DateFebruary 26, 2014

Time7:00am to 9:00am

Location
4276 Bunche Hall

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This article provides a game theoretic analysis of group decision making, investigating how agents’ communication behavior is affected by different voting systems. We show that in an ideal state where communication is noisy but agents can communicate without opportunity costs, agents will always reach unanimous consensus regardless of which voting system governs the deliberative process. This is because agents anticipate their future agreement and hence, in equilibrium, communicate truthfully and vote sincerely. As a result, the agents’ private information is aggregated efficiently, making the deliberative process optimal. We further show that under the more realistic case in which communication involves opportunity costs, voting systems shape agents’ communication behavior. Specifically, when the opportunity costs of communication are low, a voting system based on unanimity approximates the results of the ideal state. Conversely, when communication involves high opportunity costs, a voting system based on majority is more desirable. These results shed some lights on the rationale of institutions such as juries, committees, and large deliberative assemblies.

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