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Education

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1992
Dissertation: *Farsighted Coalitional Stability*
Committee: Roger Myerson (chair), Steve Matthews, Joel Mokyr, Stan Reiter, Robert Weber
B.S., Economics, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, 1985

Academic positions

University of California, Los Angeles
Associate Professor of Political Science, 2002–present
Assistant Professor of Political Science, 2001–2002
University of Utah
Associate Professor of Economics, 2000–2001
New York University
Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics, 1999–2002 (on leave 2000–2002)
University of Chicago
Assistant Professor of Economics, 1992–1999
Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Economics, 1991–1992

Publications

Books

Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. 2001. Princeton University Press.

Gishiki wa Nani no Yaku ni Tatsuka: Geemu Seorii no Resson [What Do Rituals Do? Lessons from Game Theory]. Japanese translation of *Rational Ritual*. 2003. Tokyo: Shinyo-sha. Yuki Yasuda, translator.

理性的儀式 [*Rational Ritual*]. Chinese translation of *Rational Ritual*. 2004. Taipei: Laureate Book Co., Ltd. 張慧芝 and 謝孝宗, translators.

Jane Austen, Game Theorist. Forthcoming, Princeton University Press, April 2013.

Articles

- "Anonymous Procedures for Condorcet's Model: Robustness, Nonmonotonicity, and Optimality." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5 (2010): 45–70.
- "Rational Choice and the Humanities: Excerpts and Folktales," *Occasion: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities* 1 (2009).
- "Rationally Constructing the Dimensions of the Political Sphere," *International Journal of Game Theory* 35 (2007): 205–221.
- "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," *Review of Economic Studies* 67 (2000): 1–16.
- "Structure and Strategy in Collective Action," *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (1999): 128–156.
- "The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs," *Journal of Economic Theory* 87 (1999): 49–71.
- "Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare," *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 85–97.
- "Culture, Circles, and Commercials: Publicity, Common Knowledge, and Social Coordination," *Rationality and Society* 10 (1998): 47–75.
- "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," *Journal of Economic Theory* 63 (1994): 299–325.
- "Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," *Economic Journal* 100 (1990): 1109–1121.
- "The Discrete Bid First Price Auction," *Economics Letters* 31 (1989): 303–306.

Reviews

- Review of *Social Dynamics*, edited by Steven N. Durlauf and H. Peyton Young, *Journal of Economic Literature* 41 (2003): 906–907.
- Review of *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, edited by Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, *Journal of Economic Literature* 37 (1999): 668–669.
- Review of *If You're So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise*, by Donald N. McCloskey, *Journal of Economic Literature* 30 (1992): 2135–2137.

Working papers

- "The May 1 Marchers in Los Angeles: Overcoming Conflicting Frames, Bilingual Women Connectors, English-Language Radio, and Newly-Politicized Spanish Speakers" (with co-authors Kim Yi Dionne, Darin Dewitt, and Michael Stone).
- "Incentive Compatibility Implies Signed Covariance."
- "Strategic Reliability of Communication Networks."

Fellowships and grants

- National Science Foundation grant SBR-9712277, "Structure and Strategy in Collective Action," September 1, 1997–August 31, 2001
- Alfred P. Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, 1989–1990

Invited lectures and conference presentations

- “Why Don’t High-Status People Realize that Low-Status People are Strategic? Cluelessness as Analyzed by Austen and Other Examples of Folk Game Theory”
Yale University School of Management, 2011, Oxford University, 2011, Stockholm School of Economics, 2011
- “Jane Austen and the Prehistory of Game Theory”
Jacob Marschak Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles, 2010
- “A Robust and Optimal Anonymous Procedure for Condorcet’s Model”
University of California, Irvine, 2009, Wallis Annual Political Economy Conference, University of Rochester, 2009
- “Sí Se Puede: Who Attended the May 1st Marches and Why?”
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 2007, University of California, Los Angeles, 2006, with Kim George, Darin DeWitt, and Michael Stone
- “Statistical Game Theory”
Columbia University, 2008, New York University, 2008, GREQAM, 2007, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2007, Universitat de Girona, 2007, University of California, Los Angeles, Economics Department, 2006, University of California, Berkeley, 2006, University of California, Los Angeles, Political Science Department, 2005, NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005, University of Chicago, 2004, Northwestern University, 2004, University of Washington, 2004, Conference on the Dynamics of Interactive Decision Making, University of California, Irvine, 2002, University of California, San Diego, 2001, University of Texas at Austin, 2000, Rice University, 2000
- “Folktales as Early Game Theory,” “Correlated Equilibrium and Statistical Game Theory,”
“The Partition Model of Incomplete Information”
Yuan-Dong Sheu Memorial Lecture Series, National Taiwan University, 2005
- “Memory in the System”
Conference on the Complexities of Diversity: Rethinking Gaps and Leveraging Differences, University of Michigan, 2005
- “Rational Choice and the Humanities: Excerpts and Folktales”
Conference on Rational Choice Theory and the Humanities, Stanford University, 2005
- “The Future of Rational Choice Theory”
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 2003
- “Rationally Constructing the Dimensions of the Political Sphere”
University of Rochester, 2003, University of Southern California, 2002, University of California, Berkeley, 2001, George Mason University, 2001, Conference on Cognition, Emotion, and Rational Choice, UCLA, 2000
- “Common Knowledge, Collective Identity, and New Communication Technologies”
SSRC conference on Cooperation and Conflict in a Connected World, New York, 2002
- “Is Communal Violence Generally Susceptible to Contagion Effects?”
Brookings Institution, 2001

“Culture, Circles, and Commercials: Publicity, Common Knowledge, and Social Coordination”

SSRC conference on Cooperation and Conflict in a Connected World, University of California, Berkeley, 2001, From Signals to Structured Communication, Cornell University, 2001, The Rules of the Game of Politics in the Middle Ages, UCLA, 2001, George Mason University, 2000, Cornell University, 1999, New York University, 1998, Rational Choice and Beyond: The Future of Political Economy Conference, Lake Arrowhead, UCLA, 1997, Social Interactions and Aggregate Economic Activity Workshop, Santa Fe Institute, 1997, Midwest Faculty Seminar, University of Chicago, 1997, Applications of Economics Workshop, University of Chicago, 1997, Center for the Study of Politics, History, and Culture, University of Chicago, 1996, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 1995, Chicago Humanities Institute, University of Chicago, 1995, Applications of Economics Workshop, University of Chicago, 1995

“Structure and Strategy in Collective Action: Communication and Coordination in Social Networks”

University of California, Irvine, 2001, University of Utah, 2000, McGill University, 1999, Pennsylvania State University, 1999, Princeton University, 1999, University of Western Ontario, 1999, Vanderbilt University, 1999, Cornell University, 1998, Workshop on Interactive Dynamics and Learning, State University of New York, Stony Brook, 1998, Iowa State University, 1998, NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference, University of Minnesota, 1998, University of Southern California, 1998, International Conference on Public Economic Theory, University of Alabama, 1998, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 1997, California Institute Technology, 1997, University of California, Davis, 1997, University of California, Irvine, 1997, University of California, Los Angeles, 1997, University of California, San Diego, 1997, University of Iowa, 1997, University of Minnesota, 1997, Social Learning Workshop, State University of New York, Stony Brook, 1996, Social Interactions and Aggregate Economic Activity Workshop, Santa Fe Institute, 1996, Economic Theory Workshop, University of Chicago, 1996, Social Organization of Competition Workshop, University of Chicago, 1996, Johns Hopkins University, 1996, Rutgers University, 1996, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1996, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, 1996

“Taking Turns and Majority Rule, Guinier and Condorcet, Minority Rights and Majority Welfare”

University of California, Los Angeles, 2000, University of Minnesota, 2000, Georgetown University, 1999, University of California, Irvine, 1998, University of California, San Diego, 1998, Rutgers University, 1998, Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Chicago, 1998, Economic Theory Workshop, University of Chicago, 1996

“The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs”

Indiana University and Purdue University at Indianapolis 1996, NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference, University of Illinois, 1995, Southern Methodist University, 1995, Northwestern University Math Center Bag Lunch, 1995, Money and Banking Workshop, University of Chicago, 1995

“Strategic Reliability of Communication Networks”

Economic Theory Workshop, University of Chicago, 1994

“Farsighted Coalitional Stability”

Summer Game Theory Conference, Northwestern University, 1992, University of Chicago, 1992, Korea University, 1992, Ohio State University, 1992, University of Pittsburgh, 1992, Rutgers University, 1992, Seoul National University, 1992, University of Western Ontario 1992, International Conference on Game Theory and Economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1991, University of California, Davis, 1991, University of Minnesota, 1991

“Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model”

Hallim University, Korea, 1992, California Institute of Technology, 1991, University of California, Los Angeles, 1991, University of Pennsylvania, 1991, Stanford University, 1991, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1991, Cliometric Society Summer Conference, 1990, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Moscow, 1989, Northwestern University, 1989

Graduate teaching responsibilities

Dissertation advisor to Dragan Filipovich, Eduardo Rodes, David Stockman (University of Chicago economics)

Dissertation committee member for Joslyn Barnhart, Alfonso Gonzales, Shuhei Kurizaki, Dena Montague, Thiam Chye Tay (UCLA political science), Guillermo Ordenez, Nina Walton, Viola Chen, Neda Sertac, Mark Dincecco (UCLA economics), Juan Manuel Jaurgui (UCLA Anderson School), Yunkyu Sohn (UCSD political science), Philip Bond, Fang Deng, Mark Fisher, Hao Li, Shih-hao Luo, Jim Miller, Atsuomi Obayashi, Philippe Pennelle, (University of Chicago economics), Eugene Wolfe (University of Chicago political science)

Organized Economic Theory Workshop, University of Chicago, 1996–1998

Organized Graduate Theory Bag Lunch, University of Chicago, 1993–1996

Professional responsibilities

Program Committee, Econometric Society 10th World Congress, 2010

Co-Editor, American Political Science Review, 2007–2009

Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2002–2004

Consulting Editor, American Journal of Sociology, 2002–2004

Divison Chair, Formal Political Theory, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, 2008

Referee reports for American Economic Review, American Journal of Political Science, American Journal of Sociology, American Political Science Review, American Sociological Review, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Political Economy, Management Science, Mathematical Social Sciences, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Rationality and Society, Review of Economic Studies

Manuscript reviews for Cambridge University Press, MIT Press, Oxford University Press, Princeton University Press

Proposal reviews for National Science Foundation

Administrative responsibilities

Search Committee, Dean of the Division of Social Sciences, UCLA, 2008–2009

Recruitment Committee, Center for Korean Studies, UCLA, 2006

Executive Committee, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 2002–2006, 2008–2010

Graduate Admissions Committee, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 2001–2002,
2005–2008, 2011–2012

Merit Review Committee, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 2003–2005

Chair, Committee on Political Economy, Department of Political Science, UCLA,
2002–2006

Chair, Recruitment Committee, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 2003–2004

Personal information

Birthdate: December 23, 1965

Citizenship: USA

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