

Brief Curriculum Vitae, Barry O'Neill, January 2013

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EDUCATION

1976 – Ph.D., Psychology, University of Michigan

1969 -- B.A., Mathematics, University of Michigan

FACULTY POSITIONS

2001-present – Professor of Political Science, UCLA.

2004-2005 – Visiting Professor, Cowles Foundation, Yale University

1999-2001 – Visiting Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

1991-1998 – Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale School of Management

1989-1991 – Associate Professor of Political Science and of Economics, York University

1979-1989 – Assistant and Associate Professor of Industrial Engineering and
Management Sciences, Northwestern University

SELECTED AND RECENT PUBLICATIONS

2010

* Policy legends and folklists, traditional beliefs in the public sphere. (with Gary Fine).
Forthcoming, *Journal of American Folklore*.

2009

*Two strategic issues in apologizing. 243-258 in Simon Levin, ed., *Games, Groups and
the Global Good*. New York: Springer.

*A Talmudic Division Problem with a Circle of Claims
(draft, www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/boneill/)

2008

*Lexicographic decomposition of simple games (with Belazel Peleg). *Games and
Economic Behavior*. 28: 828-842.

2007

*Rational Behavior in a Disorderly Cascade
(draft, www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/boneill/)

*Game models of peace and war, some recent developments. 25-44 in R. Avenhaus and
W. Zartmann. *Diplomacy Games*. New York: Springer.

2006

*National Prestige and Nuclear Weapons. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1560, Yale University.

*Normative and strategic aspects of transitional justice, editors' introduction to the special issue. (with Marek Kaminski and Monika Nalepa). *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 50: 295-302.

2004

*What Good is a Disinterested Powerless Mediator?
(draft, www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/boneill)

2003

*Mediating national honour: lessons from the era of dueling. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*. 159: 229-247.

*Bargaining with an agenda. (with Dov Samet, Zvi Winer and Eyal Winter). *Games and Economic Behavior*. 48: 139-153.

2001

*Risk aversion in international relations theory. *International Studies Quarterly*. 45:617-640.

*The Italian sordellina: a possible ancestor of the Irish regulators. *Sean Reid Society Journal*. Vol. 2.

1999

**Honor, Symbols and War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (paperback, 2001.)

1996

*Power and satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 40: 219-237.

1995

*Game theory models of peace and war. 995-1053 in R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds., *Handbook of Game Theory*. New York: Elsevier.

1994

*A question of procedure at the Vienna Arms talks. In Michael Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher, eds. *Cooperative Game Models in International Relations*. Boston: Kluwer.

*History of a hoax. *New York Times Magazine*. March 10. 46-49.

1991

*The strategy of challenges: two beheading games in medieval literature. 124-149 in Reinhard Selten, ed. *Game Equilibrium Models, IV*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

1987

*A non-metric test of the minimax theory of zero-sum games. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. 84:2106-2109.

*A measure for crisis instability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 31: 631-672

1986

*International escalation and the dollar auction. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 30: 33-50.

1982

*A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. *Mathematical Social Sciences*. 2: 345-371, 1982.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

**Sincere Communication*. Book manuscript.

**Nuclear Prestige and the Nuclear Taboo* Book manuscript.

*Sharing the Cost of IGO's by Virtual Taxation, submitted to *Global Governance*

*A Talmudic Division Problem Involving an Inconsistent Structure of Rights, submitted to *Games and Economic Behavior*.

8Game Theory and the Emotions, book chapter for *Emotion in Group Decision and Negotiation*, Springer-Verlag.

PRIZES, AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS

*Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, 2012-2012

*Leon Levy Foundation Fellowship, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. 2008-2009

*Russell Sage Foundation Fellowship. 2004-2005

*Cowles Foundation, Yale University, 2003-2004

*American Political Science Association, Woodrow Wilson Award for the Best Book in Government, Politics, or International Affairs, 2000, for *Honor, Symbols and War*.

*Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 1999-2001.

*Fellowship, Economics Department (*Wirtschaftstheorie III*), Bonn University, Fall 1998.

*Visiting Professor, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Spring 1999.

*Fellow, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989-1990.

*MacArthur Fellowship in International Security, 1989-1991.

SELECTED AND RECENT PRESENTATIONS

2012

November 2012 – Higher-order Beliefs in the Social Sciences – Center for the Advanced Study of the Social Sciences, Stanford.

September 2012 (planned, not effected) – Focal Gaps and Weapons Taboos, American Political Science Association, New Orleans

2011

November 2011 The Nuclear Weapons Taboo, Institut des Hauts Etudes, Geneva

February 2011 Game Theory and the Social Dynamics of Civil Wars, Oslo, Norway

2010

September 2010 The Stability-Instability Paradox, American Political Science Association (with Robert Trager)

*Vagueness, Prestige and Taboos. Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine.

2009.

*Honor and International Violence. Leon Levy Foundation Lecture, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.

*Vagueness and Games. Invited address, Annual Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook.

2008

*What does it mean to make an agreement? Conference on Rationality, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.

2007

*Strategic Issues in Apologizing. Templeton Foundation Conference on Games, God and the Global Good. Princeton.

2006.

*Global Game Models in International Relations. Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

*Apologies in International Relations. Russell Sage Foundation, New York.

*Game-theoretical Perspectives on Reputation. Workshop on Rationality and Reputation in International Relations. Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton.

2005

*Games and Decisions on the Timing of an Attack. Microfoundations of Terrorism Panel, Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

*Apologies to and from Institutions. Yale School of Management, New Haven.

*Unresearched Problems in the Theory of Bargaining: Franklin Negotiates the Treaty of Paris, 1783. American Association for the Advancement of Sciences. New York
*Game Theory's Advice for the Practicing Mediator. Invited talk, Conference of Connecticut Civil Justice Foundation, Trumbull.

2004

*Terrorism and Symbolism. National Academy of Sciences Conference, Living with Risk. Boston.
*Symbolism in Apologies. Conference on Truth, Justice and Redress in Post-Conflict Societies, Weatherhead Center, Harvard University.

2001

*Game Theory and Emotions. Invited talk, World Game Theory Conference, Bilbao.
*Thomas Schelling and Strategic Theory. Panel in Honor of Thomas Schelling, American Political Science Association Meeting, San Francisco.