UCLA Political Science

Test Event 2
2018-04-26 00:00 (America/Los_Angeles)
Test Event 2
DateApril 24, 2014
Time1:00pm
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IR Workshop - Brandon Kinne, UC Davis
2018-04-23 00:00
IR Workshop – Brandon Kinne, UC Davis
DateApril 17, 2017
Time3:00pm to 4:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:Why do states join international organizations (IOs)? Cooperation theory offers a number of plausible answers to this question. However, empirical analysis of IOs has not kept pace with theory. We identify three key limitations in existing empirical research on IO membership. First, the units of analysis commonly used to model membership, such as the country-year or dyad-year, do not sufficiently distinguish between the attributes of states and the attributes of IOs. Not only do states select IOs, but IOs also select states, which necessitates careful attention to the attributes of each. Second, empirical models generally ignore the “match quality” between countries and IOs, implicitly assuming that all IOs are equally accessible to all countries. In practice, many IOs are functionally off-limits to large numbers of states, while others attract only certain types of states. Third, although cooperation theorists have long argued that IO membership is partially influenced by social effects, where the IO memberships of some states influence the memberships of others, few empirical models incorporate social effects into the analysis. We address these limitations by modeling IO membership as a dynamic affiliation network. Using newly collected data at the state-IO level, we build an inferential network model that addresses all three of the above limitations. The analysis shows that state-IO match quality and social effects are, by far, the primary determinants of IO membership.
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International Relations Workshop with Barbara F. Walter
2018-04-23 00:00
International Relations Workshop with Barbara F. Walter
DateApril 20, 2015
Time12:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Barbara F. Walter, UC San DiegoTitle: “The Logic of Rebel Strategies in Civil War”Abstract:[This] paper … is part of a book about rebel groups and how competition affects their behavior during civil wars. It starts from the observation that rebel groups often act quite differently from each other even when they are pursuing similar goals. I argue that the structure of the competitive environment in which rebel groups operate explains much about their behavior during civil war. The more competition rebel groups face from rival factions or potential factions, the more attention they are likely to pay to the needs of the local population and the better and more benevolently they will govern. In addition, the greater the competition, the more likely rebel groups are to pursue strategies designed to deter and eliminate rivals. The particular characteristics of the competitive environment, therefore, could influence the behavior of rebel groups in important ways and could help explain the variation in rebel behavior across conflicts and over time. About the Speaker:Barbara F. Walter (Ph.D. 1994, Univ. of Chicago) is Professor of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Affiliated Faculty of Political Science at UCSD. She has also been a fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, the War and Peace Institute at Columbia University, and the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University. Prof. Walter is an expert on international security, with emphasis on civil wars as well as and terrorism/counter-terrorism. Her current research interests include the organization and behavior of rebel groups during civil war, as well as the rise of Islamic extremism. She is the recipient of numerous grants and fellowships, including awards from the National Science Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Guggenheim and Smith Richardson Foundations.PaperClick here to download.
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A Vocation Unto Death: Mortality and Politics in Max Weber's Thought
2018-04-23 00:00
A Vocation Unto Death: Mortality and Politics in Max Weber’s Thought
DateApril 21, 2014
Time5:15am to 6:45am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Libby Barringer is the 2011 recipient of the Swarr Price. In this paper I take up Max Weber’s familiar interpretation of disenchanted modernity and the problem it poses for meaningful life—and in particular Weber’s depiction of political life—from the less familiar perspective of the meaningfulness of death. By modeling meaningful, modern death on the idealized soldier who serves on the field of battle, Weber has attempted to push back the effects of a totally rationalized, progressive understanding of life and death. Yet when contrasted to older models of soldierly death, as seen in the model of the dying hero in Homer or the soldiers eulogized by Pericles, reliance on this model in disenchanted modernity is revealed to have a price. This model of meaning, which so heavily emphasizes individual conviction in the meaningfulness of service unto death, exacerbates the tendency for political rivalry to become political war. Aside from a slim moment of the choice of which cause one is willing to die for, it is not apparent that the meaningful life lived with soldierly devotion promotes any responsible accounting for the political—therefore potentially violent—consequences of one’s actions.
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Swarr Prize Lecture: Libby Barringer
2018-04-23 00:00
Swarr Prize Lecture: Libby Barringer
DateApril 21, 2014
Time12:15pm to 1:45pm
Location
Contact
UCLA Department of Political Scienceinvites you to the Speaker SeriespresentingLibby BarringerUCLA Political Science, Ph.D. Candidatewho is the 2011 recipient ofThe Swarr Prize”A Vocation Unto Death: Mortality and Politics in Max Weber’s Thought” Monday, April 21, 201412:15 – 1:45 PM 4357 Bunche Hall ABSTRACT:In this paper I take up Max Weber’s familiar interpretation of disenchanted modernity and the problem it poses for meaningful life—and in particular Weber’s depiction of political life—from the less familiar perspective of the meaningfulness of death. By modeling meaningful, modern death on the idealized soldier who serves on the field of battle, Weber has attempted to push back the effects of a totally rationalized, progressive understanding of life and death. Yet when contrasted to older models of soldierly death, as seen in the model of the dying hero in Homer or the soldiers eulogized by Pericles, reliance on this model in disenchanted modernity is revealed to have a price. This model of meaning, which so heavily emphasizes individual conviction in the meaningfulness of service unto death, exacerbates the tendency for political rivalry to become political war. Aside from a slim moment of the choice of which cause one is willing to die for, it is not apparent that the meaningful life lived with soldierly devotion promotes any responsible accounting for the political—therefore potentially violent—consequences of one’s actions.Click here to download the paper. NOTE: the paper is password-protected, please email Belinda Sunnu at bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu to obtain the password.
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PT Workshop - Arash Davari
2018-04-20 00:00
PT Workshop – Arash Davari
DateApril 15, 2016
Time4:00pm to 6:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
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Earning and Learning the Latino Vote: Campaign Effects in 2008 - 2012
2018-04-18 00:00
Earning and Learning the Latino Vote: Campaign Effects in 2008 – 2012
DateApril 16, 2014
Time5:00am to 7:00am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Amidst double digit unemployment in the Latino community, Barack Obama nevertheless made substantial gains in the Latino vote in 2012. This project explores how candidates adapt and learn new strategies in targeted outreach from campaign to campaign. I argue that the Obama campaign drastically revised their 2008 strategy, to embrace immigration as a campaign issue in 2012, after seeing the strategy employed by Harry Reid in 2010, and that Latino voters were in fact motivated by immigration claims in 2012, unlike 2008. Using data from Latino Decisions surveys in 2008, 2010, 2012, this project models Latino vote choice in presidential elections and demonstrates campaign strategy matters greatly and that successful campaigns are dynamic and evolve to best win over important voting blocs.
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CP Workshop - Arturas Rozenas, New York University
2018-04-16 00:00
CP Workshop – Arturas Rozenas, New York University
DateApril 10, 2017
Time12:30pm to 2:00pm
Location
6275 Bunche Hall (History Conference Room)
Contact
Abstract:It is commonly believed that autocratic governments censor negative news and amplify positive news. We argue that such simplistic fact-censoring may have only a limited value when it comes to economic news, because citizens can easily benchmark the official news against their own private perceptions. Instead of censoring facts about the domestic economy, the government can preserve its good reputation in face an economic calamity by `bundling’ news in a way that assigns the responsibility for bad events to exogenous causes and positive events to the efforts of the government. Using a large corpus of daily news reports from three national television channels in Russia from 2000 to 2016, we identify two empirical patterns that are consistent with this theoretical insight: First, negative and positive economic events are reported at very similar rates on Russian state-owned television indicating no evidence of fact-censoring. Second, negative news reports are more likely to implicate external factors, especially global economic processes and Western governments, but when the news are positive they are more likely to implicate the domestic government, especially president Putin.
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IR Workshop - Richard Steinberg, UCLA
2018-04-16 00:00
IR Workshop – Richard Steinberg, UCLA
DateApril 10, 2017
Time3:00pm to 4:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:This study examines how arrests of militia leaders pursuant to international criminal warrants have affected demobilization of Rwandan militias in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Hypotheses as to causes of demobilization were derived from the literature and interviews in Eastern Congo. Models based on those hypotheses were tested against a data set of all Rwandan combatants, commanders, dependents processed through UN-operated demobilization camps in the DRC from 2003-12. The models confirm that arrests are significantly and substantially related to increased demobilization. The models also confirm other factors significantly related to the rate of demobilization, including: policies and events that increased or decreased military pressure on Rwandan militias; the UN’s mobile radio and leafleting “sensitization” campaign; and the rainy season. The findings show that decapitation by arrest may be a viable strategy for advancing peace by degrading a militia or other armed force, particularly in patronage-based militias.
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AP Workshop - Robert Van Houweling, UC Berkeley
2018-04-16 00:00
AP Workshop – Robert Van Houweling, UC Berkeley
DateApril 10, 2017
Time12:30pm to 2:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:I formalize the intuition that legislators would prefer not to take roll calls that divide the median voter in their district from the median voter in their party’s primary electorate. Such votes inevitably create a “smoking gun” that can be exploited by a primary or general election challenger, giving incumbents an incentive to keep these roll calls off the agenda. I also offer experimental evidence to support key assumptions made in the model. The model offers an explanation for low majority roll rates and other types of majority gatekeeping rooted in individual‐level electoral incentives rather one rooted in than collective incentives and party discipline.
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CP Workshop - Jennifer Pan
2018-04-16 00:00
CP Workshop – Jennifer Pan
DateApril 11, 2016
Time12:30pm to 2:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
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Comparative Politics Workshop with Stephan Haggard
2018-04-16 00:00
Comparative Politics Workshop with Stephan Haggard
DateApril 13, 2015
Time12:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Stephan M. Haggard, UC San DiegoTitle: “Inequality, Distributive Conflict and Reversions from Democracy during the Third Wave”About the Topic:This talk reports on findings from a book manuscript on inequality, distributive conflict and regime change (co-authored with Robert Kaufman, Rutgers Univ.). A cluster of formal models by Boix as well as Acemoglu and Robinson has advanced the idea that institutional change may be driven by underlying class conflicts. In particular, democracy may be overthrown by elites challenged by democratic redistribution. We subject this theory to both quantitative and qualitative empirical test using a unique dataset on the presence or distributive conflict during the Third Wave. We find little evidence that inequality matters nor that distributive conflict is consequential for reversions from democratic rule. We emphasize, rather, a cluster of factors we label “weak democracy syndrome”: praetorian histories, economic crises and the deeper problem of weak institutional constraints on the political process. About the Speaker:Stephan Haggard (Ph.D. 1983, UC Berkeley) is Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies, Director of the Korea-Pacific Program, and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego’s School of International Relations and Pacific Studies. He works on the political economy of developing countries — with a particular interest in Asia and on the Korean peninsula – and his current research focuses on the relationship between inequality, democratization, and authoritarianism in such countries. Prof. Haggard has written extensively on the political economy of North Korea (with Marcus Noland), including Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (2007) and Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea (2011). He is also editor of the Journal of East Asian Studies and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
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American Politics Workshop with Michael Tomz
2018-04-16 00:00
American Politics Workshop with Michael Tomz
DateApril 13, 2015
Time3:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Michael Tomz, Stanford UniversityTitle: “Political Repositioning: A Conjoint Analysis”Abstract: A persistent puzzle in contemporary American politics is the polarization of political officeholders. One possible cause is the two-stage electoral process in the United States, which requires candidates to secure a nomination from their party prior to contesting a general election. We offer a theory of the costs that candidates incur when they change their positions on policy issues over time, and consider how these costs will influence the strategic choices of candidates who enter the second stage of a two-stage election with divergent policy positions. We test our theory using a conjoint experimental design that presents subjects with a choice between two candidates who have a set of randomly assigned characteristics. These characteristics include the positions the candidates take on a policy issue in the current day and the positions that they took a year prior, their party affiliations, and a range of other electorally salient attributes. We administer our experiments on a national sample of 4,200 adults. We find that repositioning brings substantial electoral costs across a range of policy issues. As a result of these costs, public opinion must be running nearly 70-30 in favor of one side of an issue before politicians who previously took the other side of the issue will find it electorally optimal to switch their positions. Thus, we conclude, the electorate itself provides strong disincentives for politicians who enter a general election with divergent positions to moderate their stances and represent the views of the median voter.About the Speaker:Michael Tomz (Ph.D. 2001, Harvard Univ.) is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University and a senior fellow at its Institute for Economic Policy Research as well as at the Stanford Center for International Development. His research interests include political economy, elections, political opinion, international relations, and methodology. His most recent book, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries was published by Princeton Univ. Press in 2007. Another book, on Political Repositioning (co-authored with Robert Van Houweling of UC Berkeley), is under contract, also with Princeton.
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Eroded Unity and Clientele Migration. Explaining The Demise of the PRI Regime
2018-04-16 00:00
Eroded Unity and Clientele Migration. Explaining The Demise of the PRI Regime
DateApril 14, 2014
Time5:15am to 6:45am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Sebastián Garrido de Sierra is the 2012 recipient of The Swarr Prize. Abstract: This paper offers a new explanation of the demise of the PRI regime. I argue that by late 1995 the PRI was able to remain as Mexico’s dominant party because its elite still had strong incentives to remain united. This, in turn, allowed the party to maintain the control over its unparalleled clientelistic machine, and, consequently, to keep its advantage over voters’ mobilization in order to win elections. The 1996 electoral reform drastically transformed this situation. By changing the structure of incentives for many PRI faction leaders, the reform triggered the rapid erosion of this party’s elite unity, leading to the migration of experienced cadres and the valuable clientelistic machines under their control to other parties. This soon translated into significant electoral defeats for the PRI, including the loss of the presidency in 2000. Using evidence of two new datasets, the statistical results indicate that the 1996 reform increased almost four times the probability that a mid- or high-ranked PRI member defected the party, even after controlling for socioeconomic levels, economic performance and, importantly, the PRI’s electoral results in the previous state and federal elections.
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Democratic Peace and the Wisdom of Crowds: A Theory and Experimental Evidence of Collective Intelligence in Ultimatum Bargaining
2018-04-13 00:00
Democratic Peace and the Wisdom of Crowds: A Theory and Experimental Evidence of Collective Intelligence in Ultimatum Bargaining
DateApril 11, 2014
Time8:00am to 9:30am
Location
11377 Bunche Hall
Contact
The well-established democratic peace finding that there are few, if any, clear cases of war between mature democratic states has generated a great deal of scholarly interest. In this paper, we propose a new theory for the democratic peace that highlights a previously unexplored advantage that democracies may have in crisis bargaining. Specifically, we argue that the diverse collection of independently-deciding individuals characteristic of democratic states is likely to produce better, more accurate predictions about the reservation price (i.e. the capabilities and resolve) of an opponent than individual leaders or even military experts in situations of ultimatum bargaining. As a result of this collective intelligence, we expect that bargaining with a group of diverse decision-makers will fail less often. In order to test these expectations and distinguish our mechanism from existing theories of the democratic peace, we use experimental data where subjects engage in multi-round ultimatum bargaining games. We compare the performance of offers from individuals to the performance of aggregated offers from diverse groups of individuals. We find strong support for the idea that collective decision-making decreases the likelihood of bargaining failure.
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International Relations Workshop with Christina Schneider
2018-04-09 00:00
International Relations Workshop with Christina Schneider
DateApril 6, 2015
Time12:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Christina Schneider, UC San DiegoTitle: “The Globalization of Electoral Politics in the European Union”Abstract: [The author] analyzes the globalization of electoral politics in the European Union (EU), arguing that the integration of policies in areas that affect everyday life has globalized electoral politics. If the welfare of domestic publics has become more dependent on interactions at the European level, then this should have had effects on the attractiveness of electoral strategies at the European level as well. Governments should have begun to shift electoral politics into the European arena. National elections can affect both the unilateral and collective bargaining behavior of EU governments in the European Union. First, she analyzes how domestic elections affect EU governments’ foreign policies towards the EU (that is, their unilateral bargaining behavior within the EU), and how it affects the bargaining dynamics in the EU (that is, their collective bargaining behavior within the EU) in order to shed more light on the conditions under which national elections allow governments to either influence negotiation outcomes or to defer negotiation outcomes until after the election. Second, she analyzes the effect of EU decision-making on domestic support for EU governments. Empirically, she presents the results of almost ten years of qualitative and quantitative research on the domestic electoral politics of international cooperation in the European Union. Using a number of different data sources on budgetary and legislative decision making allows for analysis of the relationship between European cooperation and national elections from various different angles.About the Speaker:Christina J. Schneider (Ph.D. 2006, Univ. of Konstanz) is Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego. Her research interests are in the fields of international and comparative political economy, distributional conflict, international organizations (with a focus on European politics), and applied methodology. Prof. Schneider’s work has appeared in the British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Public Choice, the Journal of European Public Policy, and elsewhere. Her book, Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement, was published by Cambridge Univ. Press in 2009.
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Popular Tyranny and Athenian Democracy
2018-04-05 00:00
Popular Tyranny and Athenian Democracy
DateApril 3, 2014
Time10:00am to 11:50am
Location
Hillel Center, Gindi Dining Room (2nd Floor); 574 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90025
Contact
My task in this paper is to consider whether the Athenian democracy of the late fifth century BCE can be described as “popular sovereignty.” Both terms are problematic. The term “popular” when applied to Athenian politics is the more famously fraught in our day, as we are sensitive to some of the limitations on who counted as part of the political people, that is who was included in or excluded from the body of citizenrulers. Applying the term “sovereignty” to the situation of classical Athens troubles a more specialized audience. The problem here is straightforward: sovereignty seems embedded in a later historical period, when the paradigmatic political unit is the nation state and the term – born from an attempt to articulate and reinforce the absolute authority of the king, and then transferred to the people who depose him – refers to the ruling power of a state being unitary, authoritative, and above all supreme.
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AP Workshop - Marisa Abarjano
2018-04-02 00:00
AP Workshop – Marisa Abarjano
DateMarch 28, 2016
Time3:00pm to 5:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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Instruction begins, March 30, 2015 – Monday
2018-04-02 00:00
Instruction begins, March 30, 2015 – Monday
DateMarch 30, 2015
Time6:00am
Location
Contact
Instruction begins, March 30, 2015 – Monday
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Economic Shocks and Civic Engagement: Evidence from the 2010-11 Pakistan Floods
2018-04-02 00:00
Economic Shocks and Civic Engagement: Evidence from the 2010-11 Pakistan Floods
DateMarch 31, 2014
Time5:00am to 6:30am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
How countries transition from autocracy to democracy is a key question in both economics and political science. A number of recent studies have examined links between natural disasters and democratization. Using diverse data sources we show that the massive 2010-11 Pakistan floods had no persistent economic impact, but that Pakistanis living in flood-affected places became significantly more politically engaged than their unaffected peers: they turned out to vote at substantially higher rates in subsequent elections, acquired greater political knowledge, and developed more aggressive attitudes about demanding services. These results call into question the interpretation of a broad set of papers and tie into a rich literature in political economy showing that disasters can have complicated political consequences beyond their economic impacts.
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Spring Quarter begins, March 25, 2015 – Wednesday
2018-03-28 00:00
Spring Quarter begins, March 25, 2015 – Wednesday
DateMarch 25, 2015
Time6:00am
Location
Contact
Spring Quarter begins, March 25, 2015 – Wednesday
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Winter Quarter ends, March 20, 2015 – Friday
2018-03-23 00:00
Winter Quarter ends, March 20, 2015 – Friday
DateMarch 20, 2015
Time6:00am
Location
Contact
Winter Quarter ends, March 20, 2015 – Friday
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Social Sciences Faculty Search Job Talk - Aram Hur, New York University
2018-03-22 00:00
Social Sciences Faculty Search Job Talk – Aram Hur, New York University
DateMarch 16, 2017
Time2:00pm to 4:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Citizen Duty and the Ethical Power of Communities: Evidence from East Asia
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A Theory of Vagueness Relevant to Prestige and Moral Taboos
2018-03-21 00:00
A Theory of Vagueness Relevant to Prestige and Moral Taboos
DateMarch 19, 2014
Time8:00am to 10:00am
Location
4276 Bunche Hall
Contact
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REP Workshop - Melissa Michelson, Menlo College
2018-03-19 00:00
REP Workshop – Melissa Michelson, Menlo College
DateMarch 13, 2017
Time3:00pm to 4:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
The speaker, Melissa Michelson will be presenting from her new book. Click here for a preview of the book. It describes three of the 17 experiments in the book, focusing on football fan identity.
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CP Workshop - Cyrus Samii, New York University
2018-03-19 00:00
CP Workshop – Cyrus Samii, New York University
DateMarch 13, 2017
Time12:30pm to 2:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:We use a cluster-randomized field experiment to study two strategies to promote free democratic expression among rural voters in Liberia’s 2011 general election. The context is one of a fragile state in which destructive legacies of Liberia’s 1989-2003 civil war continue to dominate people’s lives. A nine-month civic education intervention administered by Liberian civil society organization partners provided training on election procedures and a forum for monthly discussion of governance issues. A nine-month security committee intervention administered in partnership with the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Liberia provided a forum for villagers and international peacekeepers to discuss security threats and develop violence early warning and reaction procedures, with the aim of improving citizens’ perceptions of security during the election. We evaluate these programs’ effects on actual voter behavior in addition to surveyed attitudes. We find that civic education increased enthusiasm for electoral participation, produced a coordinated shift from parochial to national candidates, and increased willingness to report on manipulation. A program combining the two interventions had similar effects. The security committees produced a modest reduction in parochial voting. The policy implications are that third party actors can play a productive role in helping to overcome barriers to information, voter coordination, and security.Full paper can be found here
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Lecture - Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis
2018-03-15 00:00
Lecture – Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis
DateMarch 10, 2016
Time7:30pm
Location
UCLA Law School Building, Room 1447
Contact
Professor Putnam’s lecture is free and open to all. No RSVP is required.Light refreshments will be available.
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U HEARD IT HERE
2018-03-13 00:00
U HEARD IT HERE
DateMarch 13, 2018
Time6:30pm to 9:00pm
Location
Fowler Museum at UCLA, Lenart Auditorium Self-pay parking available in Structure 4
Contact
Barbara Geddes Professor and Chair, UCLA Department of Political Science invites you to attend The Rise and Fall of Trump’s PopulismJoshua Green Author of Devil’s Bargain and senior national correspondent for Bloomberg Businessweek in conversation with Sasha Issenberg UC Regents’ Professor and author of The Victory Lab hosted byLynn Vavreck Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics Professor, UCLA Department of Political Science Tuesday, March 13, 2018 6:30 p.m.Fowler Museum at UCLA, Lenart Auditorium Self-pay parking available in Structure 4Click to RSVPAbout the Series The UCLA Department of Political Science is proud to present the series “U Heard it Here.” The series is dedicated to exploring a deeper understanding of politics and contemporary issues.
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REP Workshop - Traci Burch, Northwestern University
2018-03-12 00:00
REP Workshop – Traci Burch, Northwestern University
DateMarch 6, 2017
Time3:00pm to 4:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:This article explores the effects of policing (measured by police- and citizen-initiated stops of pedestrians and cars) on voter turnout for the 2012 general election in St. Louis, Missouri. This is the first paper of its kind to explore the effects of policing at the precinct level using administrative data on both pedestrian and traffic stops and using administrative data on voting and vote choice. The analysis shows that more frequent contact with police is associated with decreased voter turnout in the precinct: voter turnout is lower in precincts where greater numbers of citizens are checked by police even after controlling for other potentially confounding characteristics like racial and socioeconomic demographics of the community, crime rates, and the presence of mobilizing organizations like churches.
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CP Workshop - Dorothy Kronick, University of Pennsylvania
2018-03-12 00:00
CP Workshop – Dorothy Kronick, University of Pennsylvania
DateMarch 6, 2017
Time12:30pm to 2:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:What is the political logic of dual exchange rates? Governments often invoke a populist justification, arguing that dual exchange rates protect the prices of imported consumer goods. But critics charge that dual exchange rates do little to protect consumer prices, instead creating arbitrage opportunities for powerful elites. We develop a model of the government’s tradeoff between these two constituencies (consumers vs. arbitrageurs). We then estimate the parameters of the model with an original firm-level data set from Venezuela, where, between 2003 and 2012, the government used dual exchange rates to subsidize approximately 215 billion dollars of imports at a fiscal cost of more than 100 billion. We find that the government rationed access to official-rate currency as if it valued importers nearly as much as consumers. Together with qualitative evidence, we interpret these findings as evidence that importers provided the government with essential political support.Full paper can be found here
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