IL/IR Workshop - Laurence Helfer
2018-02-16 00:00 (America/Los_Angeles) | CA
IL/IR Workshop – Laurence Helfer
DateFebruary 12, 2016
Time2:00pm to 4:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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PT Workshop - Jeanne Morefield
2018-02-16 00:00
PT Workshop – Jeanne Morefield
DateFebruary 12, 2016
Time4:00pm to 6:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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PT Workshop - Sankar Muthu, University of Chicago
2018-02-16 00:00
PT Workshop – Sankar Muthu, University of Chicago
DateFebruary 10, 2017
Time4:00pm to 6:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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IR Workshop - Lauren Prather, UC San Diego
2018-02-19 00:00
IR Workshop – Lauren Prather, UC San Diego
DateFebruary 13, 2017
Time3:00pm to 4:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:What explains variation in individual preferences for foreign economic engagement? Although much ink has been spilled on that question, little research examines how potential partner countries affect public opinion on policies such as trade, foreign aid, and foreign direct investment. We construct a new theory arguing that citizens’ perceptions of political side-taking by outside powers shape their support for engaging economically with those countries. We use original survey experiments fielded in a developed country, the United States, and a developing country, Tunisia, to test the theory. In both cases, we find that the potential partners’ side-taking in the partisan politics of the respondents’ country dramatically shapes support for foreign economic relations with other countries along partisan lines. As the rise of new aid donors, investors, and trade partners create new choices in economic partners, the theory and findings contained in this article are critical to understanding mass preferences about open economic engagement.
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AP Workshop - Jon Rogowski, Harvard University
2018-02-19 00:00
AP Workshop – Jon Rogowski, Harvard University
DateFebruary 13, 2017
Time12:30pm to 2:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:Though economic development is commonly posited to depend on the quality of political institutions, empirical research focuses mostly on how the nature and design of economic institutions affects developmental outcomes. We argue that infrastructural projects play a key role in shaping economic development and test our argument in the context of postal systems, one of the most important infrastructural consequences of state-building activities around the world. We find demonstrate support for our argument across micro-level analyses conducted at the county level in the United States and macro-level analyses conducted at the cross-national level. Our findings provide evidence that state-building projects, though frequently associated with pork-barrel politics, patronage, and corruption, provided important sources of economic development for recipient communities.Full paper can be found here
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REP Workshop with Jane Anna Gordon
2018-02-22 00:00
REP Workshop with Jane Anna Gordon
DateFebruary 19, 2015
Time12:00pm to 1:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Jane Anna Gordon, University of ConnecticutTitle: “Creolizing Political Theory”About the Speaker:Jane Gordon (Ph.D. 2005, Univ. of Pennsylvania) is Associate Professor of Political Science (Political Theory) as well as of African American Studies at UConn. She previously taught at Temple University. Her focus is on modern and contemporary political theory, Africana political thought, theories of enslavement, political theories of education, methodologies in the social sciences, and political theory in film and literature. Most recently, she is the author of the like-titled book Creolizing Political Theory: Reading Rousseau through Fanon (2014) from Fordham University PressCo-sponsored by the Political Theory WorkshopAbstract:Asking whether it is possible to develop an approach to studying political life that fully reflects its heterogeneity, [the author] offers the creolization of political theory as a viable response. Creolization describes mixtures that were not supposed to have emerged in the plantation societies of the Caribbean but did through their capacity to exemplify living culture, thought, and political practice. In so doing, they provide a useful way of understanding similar processes that continue today, namely of one potential outcome when people who were previously strangers find themselves as unequal co-occupants of new political locations they seek to call “home.” In demonstrating a path that is different from the one usually associated with multiculturalism, in which different cultures are thought to co-exist relatively separately and the aim is for each to tolerate the other by letting it remain in relative isolation, creolization describes how people reinterpret themselves through interaction with one another to create forms of belonging that are familiar but also distinctive and new. These are useful models both for reconsidering how contemporary political solidarities could be constructed and how we might envisage the relationships that may be forged among what have become radically separate fields for studying a shared world.
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International Relations Workshop with Susan Hyde
2018-02-22 00:00
International Relations Workshop with Susan Hyde
DateFebruary 19, 2015
Time12:00pm
Location
4276 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Susan Hyde, Yale UniversityTitle:”The Individual-Level Consequences of Democracy Promotion: A Field Experiment in Rural Cambodia”About the Speaker:Susan Hyde is Associate Professor of Political Science & International Affairs at Yale University. She studies international influences on domestic politics, particularly in the developing world and teaches classes in international relations and comparative politics. Prof. Hyde is an expert on international election observation, election fraud, and democracy promotion and has served as an election observer with several organizations in Afghanistan, Albania, Indonesia, Liberia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Venezuela. Her first book, The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm (Cornell Univ. Press, 2011), won several prizes, including APSA’s 2012 Comparative Democratization Section best book award.Co-sponsored by the Comparative Politics WorkshopAbstract:Since the early 1990s, efforts to promote democracy throughout the world have proliferated, yet as many scholars and policymakers lament, the effects of these democracy promotion programs are poorly understood. In this paper we introduce a randomized field experiment intended to evaluate one democracy promotion program undertaken by an international non-governmental organization in Cambodia. We show that citizen exposure to multi-party town hall meetings has positive effects on citizen knowledge about politics, attitudes towards democracy, and reported political behavior, but has null effects on citizen confidence in the political process. In addition, several months after the intervention, qualitative evidence suggests that problem issues in treatment villages are more likely to be addressed than in control villages.
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Nuclear Russian Roulette: A Model of Proliferation and Preventive War
2018-02-23 00:00
Nuclear Russian Roulette: A Model of Proliferation and Preventive War
DateFebruary 21, 2014
Time7:00am to 8:30am
Location
11377 Bunche Hall
Contact
We (Muhammet A. Bas and Andrew J. Coe) develop a formal model of bargaining between two states, where one can invest in developing nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its efforts and progress over time, and use it to analyze the occurrence of proliferation and war and the role of intelligence-gathering and estimates in these. Surprise proliferation, sporadic crises over the uncertain progress of a proliferant’s efforts, and mistaken preventive wars can all arise endogenously in the model. The technological sophistication of the proliferant and the monitoring ability of the other state influence the probabilities of war and proliferation in ways that are often counter-intuitive and non-monotonic. However, much of the variation in behavior is driven, not by these potentially policy-manipulable factors, but by chance elements such as when the proliferant’s program will make progress and when the other state will discover this. In the absence of a non-proliferation agreement, the United States and proliferants like Iran are playing what amounts to a long game of Russian roulette.
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Varieties of Corruption: The Organization of Rent-Sharing in India
2018-02-23 00:00
Varieties of Corruption: The Organization of Rent-Sharing in India
DateFebruary 21, 2014
Time6:00am to 7:30am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Studies of corruption shed little light on ways in which corrupt rents are distributed across actors—insights that would prove enlightening for efforts to reduce corruption. I posit that the type of state resource over which actors are attempting to gain control—e.g. permits and licenses versus access to benefits from welfare schemes—shapes the character of control over resource allocation and so is a key predictor of patterns in rent-sharing. I present a framework for categorizing corrupt acts that emphasizes variation in the type of government resource and highlights disparities in the character of illicit payments across multiple realms of government activity. I then draw on new and original data from surveys of Indian politicians and bureaucrats and a new measure of rent dispersion, the effective distribution of rents (EDR), to show that there is considerable sharing of rents across government and non-government actors and that the perceived distribution of rents is strongly associated with the type of government resource. My evidence also shows that rent-sharing occurs to similar degrees for different types of corruption, but that the actors who benefit from corruption depends sharply on the type of government resource.
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REP Workshop - Anna Sampaio
2018-02-23 00:00
REP Workshop – Anna Sampaio
DateFebruary 19, 2016
Time4:00pm to 6:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Professor Sampaio will be talking about her new book:(Terrorizing Latina/o Immigrants: Race, Gender, and Immigration Politics in the Age of Security, 2015, Temple University Press)
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Paola Marrati's Talk
2018-02-23 00:00
Paola Marrati’s Talk
DateFebruary 23, 2018
Time4:00pm to 6:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone (310)206-7558bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
A Voice’s of One’s Own. Cavell on Wittgenstein, Emerson, and Democracy
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Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from the Spatial Allocation of Constituency Development Fund Spending in Kenya
2018-02-26 00:00
Do Politicians Reward Their Supporters? Evidence from the Spatial Allocation of Constituency Development Fund Spending in Kenya
DateFebruary 24, 2014
Time4:00am to 5:30am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
We draw on data on the spatial allocation of more than 50,000 constituency development fund projects in more than 200 electoral constituencies in Kenya to test leading theories of distributive politics.
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Benjamin Lessing's Talk
2018-02-26 00:00
Benjamin Lessing’s Talk
DateFebruary 26, 2018
Time12:00pm to 1:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone (310)206-7558bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Paper
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Choosing (All) Together
2018-02-28 00:00
Choosing (All) Together
DateFebruary 26, 2014
Time7:00am to 9:00am
Location
4276 Bunche Hall
Contact
This article provides a game theoretic analysis of group decision making, investigating how agents’ communication behavior is affected by different voting systems. We show that in an ideal state where communication is noisy but agents can communicate without opportunity costs, agents will always reach unanimous consensus regardless of which voting system governs the deliberative process. This is because agents anticipate their future agreement and hence, in equilibrium, communicate truthfully and vote sincerely. As a result, the agents’ private information is aggregated efficiently, making the deliberative process optimal. We further show that under the more realistic case in which communication involves opportunity costs, voting systems shape agents’ communication behavior. Specifically, when the opportunity costs of communication are low, a voting system based on unanimity approximates the results of the ideal state. Conversely, when communication involves high opportunity costs, a voting system based on majority is more desirable. These results shed some lights on the rationale of institutions such as juries, committees, and large deliberative assemblies.
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Life After Degree Series
2018-02-28 00:00
Life After Degree Series
DateFebruary 26, 2014
Time10:00am to 12:00pm
Location
Career Center, 3rd Floor, Conference Room
Contact
Looking to explore ways to apply your degree to the professional world? Meet UCLA Political Science graduates and hear stories of how they leveraged their degree to launch a successful career in the law, entertainment, marketing, finance, education, and non-profit industries! Looking to explore ways to apply your degree to the professional world? Meet UCLA Political Science graduates and hear stories of how they leveraged their degree to launch a successful career in the law, entertainment, marketing, finance, education, and non-profit industries!
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REP Workshop with Cristina Beltrán
2018-03-01 00:00
REP Workshop with Cristina Beltrán
DateFebruary 26, 2015
Time12:00pm to 1:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Cristina Beltrán, New York UniversityTitle: “Undocumented and Acting Up: Queering Sovereignty in the Immigrant Rights Movement”Abstract:[I draw] on the insights of queer theory to analyze the political practices of undocumented activists, particularly those who identify now or in the past as DREAM activists. Rejecting the politics of shame and stigma, DREAM activists (particularly queer DREAM activists) challenged the logic of secrecy surrounding sexuality and illegality by “coming out” and identifying themselves “undocumented and unafraid.” While the practice of coming out has prompted various scholars to note the connections between immigration and LGBT politics, I argue that what is most powerfully queer about undocumented youth activism has to do with its dual critiques of sovereignty, state action, and preventable death. Turning to writings on AIDS by Gil Cuadros and Douglas Crimp, I explore the resonances between ACT UP’s critique of unnecessary fatalities due to government inaction and indifference to the AIDS crisis and the mass deaths occurring along the U.S.-Mexico border. At times characterized as less than human, both “homosexuals with HIV/AIDS” and “illegals” are populations whose death and suffering are disregarded since the communities in question “brought this on themselves.” Faced with a dehumanizing logic that blames them for their own suffering, gay and undocumented subjects must challenge a political culture more interested in simplistic accounts of individual action than complex analyses of global capitalism, human desire, and government failure. Both AIDS activists and the movement for undocumented rights have an ambivalent relationship to the state that seeks to expose government failure while trying to enlist the state’s resources. Analyzing achievements as well as setbacks, I explore activists’ queer account of sovereignty, particularly their efforts to gain state resources while simultaneously expressing ambivalence and despair regarding the state, its leaders, ideals, and institutions.Co-sponsored by the Political Theory Workshop
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Adam Berinsky - Rumors, Truths and Reality: A Study of Political Misinformation
2018-03-01 00:00
Adam Berinsky – Rumors, Truths and Reality: A Study of Political Misinformation
DateFebruary 25, 2016
Time12:30pm to 2:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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Lecture - The Prince, the Fat Man, and the Staff: Shakespeare’s Henry IV
2018-03-01 00:00
Lecture – The Prince, the Fat Man, and the Staff: Shakespeare’s Henry IV
DateFebruary 25, 2016
Time7:30pm
Location
UCLA Law School Building, Room 1447
Contact
Professor Allen’s lecture is free and open to all. No RSVP is required.Light refreshments will be available.
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Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud
2018-03-02 00:00
Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud
DateFebruary 28, 2014
Time6:00am to 7:30am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Most election fraud is not conducted centrally by incumbents but rather locally by a machinery consisting of hundreds of political operatives. How does an incumbent ensure that his local agents deliver fraud when needed and as much as is needed? We address this and related puzzles in the political organization of election fraud by studying the perverse consequences of two distinct incentive problems: the principal-agent problem between an incumbent and his local agents, and the collective action problem among the agents. Using the global game methodology, we show that these incentive problems result in a herd dynamic among the agents that tends to either oversupply or undersupply fraud, rarely delivering the amount of fraud that would be optimal from the incumbent’s point of view. This equilibrium dynamic predicts overwhelming victories for incumbents that are punctuated by his rare but resounding defeats and it explains why incumbents who enjoy genuine popularity often engage in seemingly unnecessary fraud. An empirical analysis of precinct-level election results from Mexico (2000-2012), Ukraine (2004), and Russia (2011-2012) supports our key claims.
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International Law/IR Workshop with Karen Alter
2018-03-02 00:00
International Law/IR Workshop with Karen Alter
DateFebruary 27, 2015
Time2:00pm to 3:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Karen Alter, Northwestern Universitywith co-author Laurence Helfer, Duke UniversityTitle: “Backlash Against International Courts in West, East, and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences”Abstract:This paper discusses three efforts to restrict the jurisdiction of sub-regional courts by African governments in response to unwelcomed international judicial rulings. In West Africa, the ECOWAS Court upheld allegations of torture by opposition journalists in the Gambia, spurring an effort by the Gambia’s political leaders to restrict the Court’s power to review human rights complaints. In East Africa, Kenya’s government attempted to eliminate the EACJ and to remove some of its judges after a decision challenging an election to a sub-regional legislature. In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe sought to suspend the SADC Tribunal and strip private access rights after the Tribunal ruled in favor of white farmers in disputes over land seizures. We argue that variations in the mobilization efforts of community secretariats, civil society groups and sub-regional parliaments explain why efforts to eliminate the three courts or narrow their jurisdiction were defeated in ECOWAS, scaled back in the EAC, and largely succeeded in SADC.
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PT Workshop - Farah Godrej, UC Riverside
2018-03-02 00:00
PT Workshop – Farah Godrej, UC Riverside
DateFebruary 24, 2017
Time4:00pm to 6:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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Seminar - Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale
2018-03-03 00:00
Seminar – Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale
DateFebruary 27, 2016
Time10:30am to 12:30pm
Location
Room to be announced
Contact
Enrollees in the seminar will be asked to read Shakespeare’s play and be ready to participate in the conversation. A pizza lunch will be delivered following the seminar.The seminar is free and open to all, but you must enroll in advance. To do so, send an email to Professor Lowenstein: lowenstein@law.ucla.edu
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Do Legislator Positions Affect Constituent Voting Decisions in U.S. House Elections?
2018-03-05 00:00
Do Legislator Positions Affect Constituent Voting Decisions in U.S. House Elections?
DateMarch 3, 2014
Time4:00am to 5:30am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
The theory of spatial voting has dominated recent scholarship on voting and elections. The spatial voting theory’s most important implication is that candidates’ ideological positions should influence voters’ decisions at the ballot box. However, existing evidence shows a weak electoral connection between legislators and their constituents. We explain this puzzle using a new dataset with the policy ideal points and voting behavior of over 100,000 Americans. We show that the spatial positions of legislators in the House of Representatives have a negligible impact on the decisions of most voters. Our results suggest that incumbent legislators face few electoral consequences for ideologically extreme positions. Legislators can take any spatial position that their partisan colleagues take with little electoral penalty in general elections. This paper provides an individual-level explanation for the lack of accountability we observe in the contemporary Congress, a phenomenon that political science theory has had little success in explaining.
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Comparative Politics Workshop with Edmund Malesky
2018-03-05 00:00
Comparative Politics Workshop with Edmund Malesky
DateMarch 2, 2015
Time12:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Contact Information
Belinda SunnuPhone bsunnu@polisci.ucla.edu
Presenter:Edmund Malesky, Duke UniversityTitle: “Participation in Legal Drafting and Compliance with Business Regulation: Evidence from Vietnam” About the Speaker:Edmund Malesky is Associate Professor of political economy, and a specialist on Southeast Asia — particularly Vietnam. Currently, his research agenda falls into three major categories: 1) authoritarian political institutions and their consequences; 2) the political influence of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations; and 3) political institutions, private business development, and formalization. Prof Malesky has published in leading political science and economic journals, including the American Political Science Review and Journal of Politics, He also serves as the lead researcher for the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index.Abstract:International development organizations invest millions of dollars each year into legislative participation campaigns in an effort to foster improved governance. This work has been undergirded theoretically by political scientists in the “deliberative democracy” tradition, who argue that participation in the drafting of new rules, through public comment periods, provides information about citizens’ needs and preferences to government. Governments can then use this information, they argue, to make laws and regulations that will enjoy wider societal compliance. Relatedly, studies in psychology and organizational behavior indicate that individuals are more likely to follow rules they have had the opportunity to influence. We propose that a similar dynamic between participation and compliance applies among businesses as well. In this paper, we first test this theory using survey data from an emerging economy, where we find that a firm is more likely to comply with business regulations when it has participated in the design of the regulatory framework. Importantly, however, we find evidence that this relationship only holds when the firm sees government to be attentive to its input, and that participation may actually be associated with less compliance when government is seen to be disinterested. We note that our effort to test theory in this space still faces significant issues of selection bias, and therefore discuss the design and preliminary results of our ongoing field experiment, where we randomized opportunities for participation by small businesses in Vietnam to a forthcoming regulation on storage of hazardous chemicals.Pre-analysis Plan:Click here to download.Provincial Competitive Index:Click here to download.
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CP Workshop - Avidit Acharya
2018-03-05 00:00
CP Workshop – Avidit Acharya
DateFebruary 29, 2016
Time12:30pm to 2:30pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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AP Workshop - Daniel Butler
2018-03-05 00:00
AP Workshop – Daniel Butler
DateFebruary 29, 2016
Time3:00pm to 5:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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CP Workshop - Dominik Hangartner, London School of Economics
2018-03-05 00:00
CP Workshop – Dominik Hangartner, London School of Economics
DateFebruary 27, 2017
Time12:30pm to 2:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
Abstract:Does exposure to the refugee crisis fuel anti-immigrant sentiment among natives and increase voting for extreme-right parties? Despite heated debates about the political repercussions of the refugee crisis in Europe, there exists very little, and sometimes conflicting, evidence with which to assess the impact of a sudden and large influx of refugees on natives’ political attitudes and behavior. We provide new causal evidence from a natural experiment in Greece, where some Aegean islands close to the Turkish border have experienced drastic increases in the number of Syrian and Iraqi refugees while other islands slightly farther away—but with otherwise similar institutional and socioeconomic characteristics—did not. Placebo tests suggest that pre-crisis trends in vote shares for exposed and non-exposed islands were virtually identical. This allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of the electoral consequences of the refugee crisis. Our study shows that among islands that faced a large inflow of refugees, vote shares for Golden Dawn, the most extreme-right party in Europe, increased by 2 percentage points (a more than 40 percent increase at the average). This increase came at the expense of the main center-right party and by mobilizing additional voters. Our findings have implications for the theoretical understanding of the drivers of anti-immigrant sentiment and for the management of refugee flows.
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PT Workshop - Clarissa Hayward
2018-03-06 00:00
PT Workshop – Clarissa Hayward
DateMarch 1, 2016
Time4:00pm to 6:00pm
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
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Lecture - Attention as a Cultural Problem
2018-03-08 00:00
Lecture – Attention as a Cultural Problem
DateMarch 3, 2016
Time7:30pm
Location
UCLA Law School Building, Room 1447
Contact
Matthew Crawford’s lecture is free and open to all. No RSVP is required.Light refreshments will be available.
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Irony and Its Politics in Civil Rights Historiography
2018-03-09 00:00
Irony and Its Politics in Civil Rights Historiography
DateMarch 7, 2014
Time8:00am to 9:30am
Location
4357 Bunche Hall
Contact
This paper is a draft section of my larger project, which is an attempt to excavate and reconstruct the philosophical foundations of the recent historiographical debate over how to periodize and understand the civil rights movement. Drawing inspiration from narrativist philosophers of history, including Hayden White, I argue that attention to the ways in which histories are narratively emplotted, using the insights of genre criticism, is indispensible for the task of disclosing the evaluative, ethical, explanatory, and aesthetic dimensions of historical narratives, as they are constructed and circulated in history, political theory, public philosophy, and the wider public. The exemplary stature of the civil rights movement in contemporary political thought draws largely, I argue, from romantic narrative tropes, but these are being increasingly contested by counterveiling narrative forms. Here, specifically, I focus on what I call “ironic” emplotments of civil rights and African-American history and attempt to give an account of their emergence, core explanatory and evaluative claims, and imaginings of politics and political action. I then offer some criticisms of this form of historical imagination and its implications for politics.
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