Methods Workshop

DateMay 28, 2014

Time3:00pm to 5:00pm

Location
4276 Bunche Hall

Contact

UCLA Department of Political ScienceMethods WorkshopSponsored by the Formal Theory Reading GroupfeaturingKirill PogorelskiyCalifornia Institute of Technology“Correlated Equilibria in Voter Turnout Games”ABSTRACT:This paper develops a game-theoretic model of turnout when voting is costly and the players’ strategies can be correlated. Varying the structure of information and voting costs, we characterize the bounds on expected turnout implementable via correlated equilibria. We show that the resulting high-turnout equilibria can be divided into two classes, depending on the relative group sizes, have intuitive properties and exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. Our results suggest a possible instrumental voting solution to the turnout paradox, and provide micro foundations for group-based voter mobilization models emphasizing the effects of communication on turnout.

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