International Relations Workshop with Aila Matanock
DateMay 4, 2015
4357 Bunche Hall
Belinda SunnuPhone email@example.com
Presenter:Aila Matanock, UC BerkeleyTitle: “International Insurance: Explaining Electoral Participation Provisions in Peace Agreement Design”Abstract:Peace agreement design is a crucial component of conflict termination, but how do combatants choose which provisions to center these settlements on? In particular, “electoral participation provisions” . . . for post-conflict elections in which militant group and government parties [both] participate — have become prevalent in peace agreements. But elections potentially complicate dividing or sharing power, while often failing to usher in democracy in these contexts. Why are they chosen? I propose that international involvement is crucial. I consider several ways in which it may make these electoral participation provisions desirable, including a novel theory which, under the right conditions, these provisions help combatants credibly commit to mutually beneficial settlements. The mechanism relies on electoral processes as coordinating cycles that ease enforcement — detecting and increasing the cost of noncompliance with the agreement for both sides — especially as international actors involve themselves in democracy promotion programs. Analysis of new quantitative evidence on peace agreement design shows the expected relationships with proxies for these expectations of external engagement, and additional qualitative evidence from Guatemala demonstrates the anticipated mechanism.
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