Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud

DateFebruary 28, 2014

Time6:00am to 7:30am

Location
4357 Bunche Hall

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Most election fraud is not conducted centrally by incumbents but rather locally by a machinery consisting of hundreds of political operatives. How does an incumbent ensure that his local agents deliver fraud when needed and as much as is needed? We address this and related puzzles in the political organization of election fraud by studying the perverse consequences of two distinct incentive problems: the principal-agent problem between an incumbent and his local agents, and the collective action problem among the agents. Using the global game methodology, we show that these incentive problems result in a herd dynamic among the agents that tends to either oversupply or undersupply fraud, rarely delivering the amount of fraud that would be optimal from the incumbent’s point of view. This equilibrium dynamic predicts overwhelming victories for incumbents that are punctuated by his rare but resounding defeats and it explains why incumbents who enjoy genuine popularity often engage in seemingly unnecessary fraud. An empirical analysis of precinct-level election results from Mexico (2000-2012), Ukraine (2004), and Russia (2011-2012) supports our key claims.

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